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Abnormal Real Activities, Meeting Earnings Targets and Firms’ 




Purpose – This paper aims to examine the extent to which Real Earnings Management (REM) is used 
in Jordan to meet zero or previous year’s earnings and how this impacts the subsequent operating 
performance of Jordanian firms.  
Design/methodology/approach – The study used a sample of 98 Jordanian listed firms over the 2010-
2018 period. To test our research hypotheses, which are formulated in accordance with both agency 
theory and signalling theory, multivariate regression is performed using a pooled OLS estimation. 
Additionally, a two-step dynamic Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) model has been estimated 
to address any concerns regarding the potential occurrence of endogeneity issues.  
Findings – Our results show that Jordanian firms that meet zero or last year’s earnings tend to exhibit 
evidence of real activities manipulations. More specifically, suspect firms show unusually low abnormal 
discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal production costs. Further, consistent with the 
signalling earnings management argument, we find that abnormal real-based activities intended to meet 
zero earnings or previous year’s earnings potentially improve the subsequent operating performance of 
Jordanian firms. This implies that REM is not totally opportunistic, but it can be used to enhance the 
subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies and 
endogeneity concerns.   
Practical implications – Our findings have several implications for policymakers, regulators, audit 
professionals, and investors in their attempts to constrain REM practices to enhance financial reporting 
quality in Jordan. Managing earnings by reducing discretionary expenses appeared to be the most 
convenient way to manipulate earnings in Jordan. It provides flexibility in terms of time and the amount 
of spending. Our empirical evidence, therefore, reiterates the crucial necessity to refocus the efforts of 
internal and external auditors on limiting this type of manipulation to reduce the occurrence of REM 
activities and enhance the subsequent operating performance of listed firms in Jordan. Drawing on Al-
Haddad & Whittington (2019), our evidence also urges regulators and standards setters to develop a 
more effective enforcement mechanism for corporate governance provisions in Jordan to minimise the 
likelihood of REM incidence.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the body of accounting literature by providing the first 
empirical evidence in the Middle East region overall on the use of REM to meet zero or previous year 
earnings by Jordanian firms. Moreover, our study is the first to empirically examine the relationship 
between REM and Jordanian firms’ future operating performance.  
Keywords- Accrual earnings management, Earnings Targets, Future operating performance, Jordan,  






Missing an earnings benchmark or reporting volatile earnings degrades the predictability of 
reported earnings, which, in turn, decreases the stock price because uncertainty is unfavored by analysts 
and investors (Graham et al., 2005). In contrast, meeting earnings benchmarks can improve the firms’ 
reputation and enhance its credibility with its stakeholders, including suppliers, creditors, and customers 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Crucially, meeting earnings benchmarks brings several benefits to the 
firm, such as maximising the stock price, avoiding litigation, and increasing the credibility of 
management for meeting stakeholders’ expectations (Bartov et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2005). Further, 
it helps to convey the future growth prospects of the firm (Graham et al., 2005). Previous literature 
shows that managers have two main options to manage reported earnings. Firstly, they can use their 
judgments in financial reporting to alter the level of accruals and obtain the desired level of earnings; 
this is known as ‘‘Accruals Earnings Management (AEM)’’(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Secondly, they 
can adjust the timing or structuring of particular transactions, investments, and allocation of company 
resources to improve reported earnings in the current period (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). This deviation from normal business practices to manipulate reported earnings 
is defined as ‘‘Real Earnings Management (REM)’’ and is the focus of this study. The results of the 
Graham et al. (2005) survey have attracted the attention of academic researchers to managers’ tendency 
to use real earnings manipulations and triggered numerous recent studies investigating this type of 
manipulation. In particular, they indicate that about 80% of managers show their willingness to sacrifice 
firm economic value (e.g. decrease the discretionary expenses on research and development (R&D) or 
advertising expenses) to manipulate accounting earnings. Additionally, they suggest that more than half 
(55.3%) of managers prefer to postpone a new investment to meet or beat a previous earnings target. 
According to Gunny (2010), a manager could decide to engage in REM to meet a benchmark 
or not to engage in REM and miss the opportunity to meet this benchmark. Consistent with the 
signalling explanation, managers who have confidence that the future performance will be better will 
use the joint signal because they expect the future growth of earnings can offset the harmful impact of 
REM and meet the benchmark. However, suppose they expect a relatively worse future performance. 
In that case, they will not use the joint signal because when the company faces an impact on earnings 
resulting from the costs of REM and the cost of setting earnings expectations higher by meeting the 
target in the previous period, investors will be disappointed. These earnings disappointments may 
damage management credibility and increase the possibility of litigation (Gunny, 2010). Recent 
empirical literature states that there has been something of a switch from accrual-based to real activities 
earnings management ( e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 
2012; Kuo et al., 2014; Franz et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2015; Enomoto et al., 2015; Ferentinou and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2016, among others). This switch is due to two possible reasons: first, depending on 
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accrual manipulation alone involves a risk; according to Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), the realised gap between unmanaged earnings and the desired earnings benchmark can exceed 
the amount by which it is possible to adjust accruals after the end of the fiscal period. If the reported 
income falls below the desired benchmark and all accrual-based strategies to meet this benchmark have 
already been exhausted, managers will end up with no choice except to switch to REM because real 
activities cannot be changed at or after the end of the fiscal reporting period. Second, managing accruals 
is more likely to draw auditor or regulators attention than real decisions about pricing and production; 
thus, managers may find it safer to manipulate real activities than discretionary accruals (Graham et al., 
2005). Drawing on Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010), we are motivated to conduct the current 
study that adds to the ongoing debate about the impact of real earnings management on future operating 
performance in emerging economies. 
Most of the previous research on the consequences of real earnings manipulations has been 
conducted in developed economies such as the US and the UK (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 
2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Leggett et al., 2016; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; among 
others). In contrast, fewer studies have examined this association in emerging economies settings (e.g., 
Tabassum et al., 2015; Gill et al., 2013; Yasser & Soliman, 2018). To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no existing study examining the impact of REM intended to achieve certain targets on future operating 
performance in the context of Jordan, specifically, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region in general. Specifically, most of the previous literature conducted in Jordan (e.g. Abbadi et al., 
2016; Alzoubi, 2016; Alzoubi, 2018; Idris et al., 2018) focused primarily on accrual earnings 
management. Although other recent studies (e.g. Al-Haddad and Whittington, 2019; Al-Haddad et al., 
2019; Alhadab et al., 2020) have investigated real earnings manipulations in Jordan, none of them has 
investigated the association between real earnings manipulation and future operating performance. This 
study, therefore, allows for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the possible impact of 
REM on the future operating performance in Jordan. 
Our study interestingly sheds light on Jordan as a part of the MENA region. The ownership 
structure is highly concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, and the degree of investor protection 
is considered weak (Al-Haddad and Whittington, 2019). For example, Jordan's major conflict of 
interests does not appear to be the one between managers and shareholders (i.e., the traditional agency 
conflict in developed economies) (Al-Haddad et al., 2019). Contrarily, the main agency concern seems 
to be between controlling shareholders, such as large block holders or companies, and powerless 
minority shareholders (Becht & Röell, 1999). Given this, we have been further motivated to explore the 
extent to which REM activities can influence future operating performance in Jordan.  
Jordan is a developing country with sufficient data for us to seek to analyze. Thus, it can give 
a window to gain insights not just for Jordan but also for the many developing economies with even 
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less information. The Jordanian capital market has a distinctive advantage of having more than half of 
its market capitalisation comprised of foreign ownership. More specifically, by the end of 2019, non-
Jordanian ownership in listed companies formed approximately 50.2% of the total market capitalization 
of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE Annual Report, 2019). Drawing on Gunny and Zhang (2014), we 
argue that when foreign owners are perceived as controlling shareholders, they may push Jordanian 
companies towards more engagement in earnings manipulations to ensure that positive financial results 
are achieved in the future. Crucially, we believe that abnormal real activities intended to meet earnings 
benchmarks to satisfy the needs of influential stakeholders, e.g., foreign shareholders, allowing for 
better future operating performance (Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018). 
Given the importance of future performance to the firm, its shareholders, and regulators, and 
given the scarcity of studies on the consequences of REM in the Middle East region, in general, and in 
Jordan, in particular, it is clear that investigating the implications of REM on subsequent operating 
performance is essential. Further, the continuing controversy on whether real earnings management, 
intended to meet specific earnings benchmarks, improves or worsens the future operating performance 
provides a strong impetus to contribute to the existing inconclusive international literature and extend 
evidence to an emerging country such as Jordan, bearing in mind that this issue has never been 
investigated before in Jordan or in the MENA region overall to the best of our knowledge. 
Based on a sample of 98 Jordanian public firms, our results demonstrate that suspect firms show 
unusually low abnormal discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal production costs. Further, 
consistent with the signalling earnings management argument, we find that abnormal real-based 
activities intended to meet zero earnings or previous year’s earnings to improve the Jordanian firm’s 
subsequent operating performance.  The findings of this study contribute to the body of earnings 
management literature by providing a more complete picture of how the three types of REM are 
associated with Jordanian firms’ future cash flow generating ability. More precisely, this study is the 
first to provide empirical evidence on the presence of real earnings management to meet earnings 
benchmarks in an emerging economy like Jordan; also, it is the first to document a positive relationship 
between meeting these benchmarks using REM and the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian 
firms. Our findings are robust to alternative measures and endogeneity concerns.   
Our study contributes to the body of existing knowledge as follows. We first investigate 
whether there is an association between real earnings manipulations and meeting earnings benchmarks, 
namely, zero or last year earnings, as they are the most common earnings targets adopted by firms’ 
management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2016; Al-Shattarat 
et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018). By doing so, our empirical evidence can raise auditors’ attention to 
devote their efforts to limit the discretionary expenses-based manipulations in order to reduce real 
earnings management and their negative impact on firms’ future performance. Second, we examine 
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whether the association between real earnings manipulation and future operating performance that has 
been documented in the US and the UK also holds for firms operating in emerging economies such as 
Jordan. In doing so, our study provides important implications for regulators and standards setters to 
develop more effective enforcement mechanisms for corporate governance implementations along with 
enhancing the quality of external audit process in an attempt to constrain earnings management 
practices, leading to improving the financial reporting quality and future performance of listed 
companies in Jordan. Also, our study contributes to the extant literature by bringing up insights about 
the earnings manipulations-meeting earnings benchmarks-future operating performance nexuses from 
an emerging economy, allowing for comparisons and a richer understanding of these relations that have 
been mainly studied in developed settings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature 
and explains how the research hypotheses are raised in light of the previous literature. Section 3 
describes our research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, robustness checks are 
presented in Section 5, followed by Section 6 that concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Empirical evidence on the negative impact of accrual-based earnings management on firm 
performance is well documented in the literature (e.g. Banker et al., 2019; Teoh et al., 1998; Dechow, 
1994,  Abbadi et al., 2016, among others). However, research on REM is still in its early stages, and 
there is no consensus regarding the impact of REM on firm future performance. In other words, whether 
REM activities destroy or improve subsequent operating performance is still a controversial issue.  
Previous studies focused on examining the impact of real earnings manipulations on future 
operating performance mainly in developed settings (e.g., Barton and Simko, 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2009; 
Hirshleifer et al., 2004; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhang, 2008; Leggett et al.2016; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018) 
with little attention has been paid to this investigation in emerging economies such as Tabassum et al. 
(2015) in Pakistan Gill et al. (2013) in India and Yasser & Soliman (2018) in Egypt. In relation to 
Jordan, the mainstream of prior scholarship (e.g. Abbadi et al., 2016; Alzoubi, 2016; Alzoubi, 2018; 
Idris et al., 2018) primarily focused on accrual-based earnings management. Others, such as Al-Haddad 
and Whittington (2019), Al-Haddad et al. (2019) and Alhadab et al. (2020), have been confined to 
exploring the prospects of real earnings manipulations in Jordan. Nevertheless, a study exploring the 
influence of REM on future operating performance in Jordan and in the MENA region at large is 
virtually non-existent. Our study, consequently, contributes to the extant literature in emerging 
economies by offering a more comprehensive understanding of the possible association between REM 
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and future operating performance in an under-researched emerging economy, which has recently 
undergone substantial regulative and economic transformations, namely Jordan. 
A review of the previous literature reveals that two opposing arguments can explain the use of 
real earnings management, opportunistic earnings management argument and signalling earnings 
management argument.   
2.1 Opportunistic Earnings Management Argument 
 
From an agency theory perspective, real earnings manipulations are value-destroying to 
shareholders because such manipulations normally harm the company’s longer-term cash flows ( 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Leggett et al. 2016). Consistent with this view, 
previous literature shows that real earnings manipulations may have a negative impact on the 
subsequent performance of the REM firms. For example,  Gunny (2005) examines the extent to which 
real earnings management affects subsequent operating performance for a sample of US firms over the 
1988 to 2000 period; she focused on four types of real earnings management activities, namely, cutting 
the discretionary investment of R&D to decrease expense, (ii) reducing the discretionary investment of 
SG&A to decrease expense, (iii) selling fixed assets to report gains and (iv) offering price discounts or 
more lenient credit terms to increase sales and/or overproduce to decrease COGS expense.  Her results 
reveal that all four real earnings management types are associated with lower ROA in the subsequent 
year. However, she identified firms with REM as those having abnormal activity measures and high net 
operating assets instead of having an incentive to meet an earnings benchmark. Thus, her results may 
be a function of her sample selection criteria because firms that have high net operating assets (whether 
they engage in REM or not) experience declines in subsequent operating performance (Barton and 
Simko, 2002; Hirshleifer et al., 2004; Taylor and Xu, 2010). 
Moreover, Zhang (2008) shows that US firms that meet analysts' cash flow forecast engage in 
higher real earnings manipulations through discretionary expenditures, production and sales to inflate 
their earnings. Besides, they document a deterioration in the subsequent operating performance of REM 
firms. Likewise, Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that beat analysts' forecasts have negative 
operating future performance and stock market performance in the subsequent three years.  
Mizik (2010) shows that engaging in myopic real earnings manipulations by reducing 
marketing and R&D expenses has a greater negative impact on future stock returns and future financial 
performance. Further, using a sample of 1511 completed US offers over the 1987 to 2006 period, Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) show that the significant post-SEO earnings declines are attributable to abnormal 
real manipulations around SEOs, suggesting that the costs of such manipulation outweighs its potential 
benefits in the SEO setting. Moreover, based on a sample of 119 firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) for the years 2004–2011, Tabassum et al. (2015) find that Pakistani firms engaged in 
real earnings management activities through sales manipulation exhibit worse future financial 
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performance. Similarly, Vorst (2015) shows that, on average, firms with real earnings management 
through a reversal of an abnormal cut in discretionary investment exhibit lower long-term operating 
performance. However, he finds that such results vary significantly depending on the various incentives 
offered to engage in REM, as well as other factors that affect its associated costs and benefits. In the 
same vein, Leggett et al. (2016) contend that REM affects firms’ future operating performance 
negatively for a sample of 1,597 US firms over 1988 to 2007. They suggest that the costs of engaging 
in REM are economically meaningful.  
2.2 Signalling Earnings Management Argument 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), managers may use earnings management to signal 
private information and offer investors useful information for the decision-making process. This notion 
was first expressed by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), who assert that informative earnings 
management aims to enhance value maximisation. Thus, the practice of earnings management may be 
motivated by beneficial intent; Fields et al. (2001, p.260) state that earnings management occurs “When 
managers exercise their discretion over the accounting numbers with or without restrictions. Such 
discretion can be either firm value maximising or opportunistic”. Within the REM context, signalling 
(or real benefits) argument suggests that abnormal real activities intended just to meet zero earnings or 
previous year’s earnings can improve the firm's credibility and reputation with stakeholders, 
strengthening, therefore, the relationships with these stakeholders and allowing for better future 
performance (Gunny and Zhang, 2014). Consistent with this view, previous literature has shown that 
firms that engage in REM experience a positive impact on subsequent performance and firm value. For 
example,  Taylor and Xu (2010) show that firms identified as conducting real earnings management 
activities do not exhibit, on average, a significant decrease in the subsequent operating performance, 
implying that managers may manipulate earnings to convey private information about the firms’ 
prospects and they carefully assess the costs and benefits of real earnings management activities to 
avoid harming future performance. Likewise, using a sample of US firms covering the years 1988 to 
2002, Gunny (2010) points that firms that engage in real activities manipulations, just to meet earnings 
targets, have relatively better subsequent operating performance than firms that do not engage in REM 
and miss or just meet the targets, suggesting that engaging in REM is not opportunistic; however, it is 
consistent with the firm getting current-period benefits that allow it to perform better in the future. Chen 
et al. (2010) investigate the extent to which the market rewards firms for meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts and how the reward differs across different forms of earnings management. They find 
differences in future operating performance consistent with how the market responds to the different 
forms of earnings management. Their results were interpreted as evidence consistent with REM being 
used as a signalling mechanism for future performance. Similarly, based on a sample of 7,966 US firm-
year observations over the period 1995 to 2008, Zhao et al. (2012) find that, in general, real earnings 
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manipulations are associated with lower future operating performance. However, abnormal real 
activities intended just to meet earnings benchmarks are positively associated with future performance.  
Most recently, using a sample from the United Kingdom, Al-Shattarat et al. (2018) investigate 
the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms' future performance for the period 
that ranges from 2009 to 2015. Their results show that manipulating operating activities such as sales, 
discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significantly 
positive consequence for firms' subsequent operating performance and signals firms' good future 
performance. Further, they find that firms that manipulate their operating activities without meeting 
earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. Jiang et al. (2018) 
recently investigated the association between firms' engagement in REM and the future performance in 
an international setting and whether the association is conditional upon country-level institutional 
factor. Using a large sample from 29 countries over the period that ranges from 2001 to 2015, they find 
that current-period REM is positively associated with future performance. Further, they state that firms 
operating in countries with strong institutional environments are driven by the positive performance 
effect. Finally, they show that when firms undertake REM in strong institutional environments, the 
future operating performance is enhanced only during a non-economic crisis period. 
To sum up, as Zhao et al. (2012, p. 125) expressed, REM's impact on future operating 
performance is ‘‘A double-edged sword’’. On the one hand, real earnings manipulations are value-
destroying to shareholders because such manipulations normally harm the company’s longer-term cash 
flows (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Mizik, 2010; Leggett et al., 2016; Vorst, 
2016). On the other hand, real earnings management allows the managers to meet earnings benchmarks, 
giving the market a signal of better future performance (Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat 
et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018).  Given this, based on the results of previous empirical research, the 
current study firstly postulates that Jordanian firms that meet zero or last year earnings exhibit evidence 
of REM, then, given the conflicting empirical results regarding the positive or negative influence of 
REM on the future performance, we assume that REM which used just to meet these earnings 
benchmarks will affect Jordanian firms’ future operating performance, no expectation for the direction 
of the relationship has been made. Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, Jordanian firms that just meet earnings benchmarks (zero earnings or last 
year’s earnings) experience evidence of real earnings manipulation. 
H2: Ceteris paribus: There is an association between using REM intended just to meet earnings 
benchmarks and Jordanian firms’ future performance. 
3. Data and Methodology 




In order to test our hypotheses, we use a sample of Jordanian firms listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange over the period that ranges from 2010 to 2018. The study covers two main sectors in Jordan, 
namely, the industrial and the service sectors. Following most previous literature in earnings 
management, the financial sector is excluded since it has a different financial reporting process than 
that of other industries. This exclusion of financial institutions is motivated by two main reasons. First, 
and most importantly, earnings management models for financial institutions are totally different from 
the non-financial sector; thus, our sample was mainly limited to non-financial corporations for 
compatibility problems. Second, excluding the financial sector is a prevalent procedure in earnings 
management studies. They substantially vary in terms of financial regulations and corporate governance 
provisions compared with their non-financial counterparts. The exclusion of these institutions results in 
133 firms. These procedures result in a final sample that consists of 98 firms (882 firm-year 
observations), 53 firms belonging to the service sector and 45 firms belonging to the industrial sector. 
Table 1 illustrates the sample selection procedure for the test periods from 2010 to 2018. 
                                         ----------------------------------------------- 
       INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
         ---------------------------------------------- 
 
According to the one-digit SIC Code classification for six different industries, the current study 
runs the regressions for six different industries with a minimum of five observations in each industry. 
Additionally, similar to (Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2015; Cupertino et al., 2015; Alhadab et al., 2015; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2016), to eliminate the effect of outlier bias, the top and bottom 1 per cent of 
independent and dependent variables are winsorized. Given the secretive nature and inadequate 
disclosure of Jordanian reporting combined with the absence of any databases that provide financial 
data information, the data used in the analysis is valuable. It was not collected from one year using the 
survey method. Instead, it is manually processed then hand-collected over the period that ranges from 
2010 to 20181. 
3.2 Earnings Management Measurement 
3.2.1 Real Earnings Proxy 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we consider three matrices to measure the level of REM: the 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, production costs, and discretionary expenditures. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), managers may engage in sales 
manipulation by accelerating sales using price discounts or more lenient credit terms in the current 
period. The temporarily boosted sales volume will likely diminish when the firm returns to the original 
prices in the next fiscal year. Additional sales increase total earnings in the current period but result in 
 
1 It is worth noting that, although the analysis covers the 2010 to 2018 period, the study also collected the 2009 and 2008 
corporate financial data to compute the real earnings management measures. Further, one year ahead (2019) was also collected 
to compute the subsequent operating performance for the sample firms. 
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reduced margins due to price discounts, lenient credit provision and higher production costs relative to 
the ‘normal’ level. Therefore, this study expects an abnormally low cash flow from operating (ABCFO) 
in the current period due to sales manipulation. 
Further, to manage earnings upward, firms can overproduce inventory to report a high 
operational margin, as the fixed overhead cost per unit declines with increasing production volume. 
Therefore, this study expects a higher value of the residual (ABPROD) estimated from Eq. (2) indicates 
greater manipulation through overproduction. Managers can also manipulate earnings by reducing 
discretionary expenditures to boost the current earnings. Therefore, based on Eq. (3), this study expects 
lower abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISXP) when real earnings management is involved. 
 
We estimate the normal levels of cash flow from operations, production costs and discretionary 
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Where CFOit is cash flow from operations taken from the statement of cash flows of firm i in 
year t, Ait-1 represents total assets at the end of year t - 1, Sit is net sales for firm i in year t, ΔSit is changes 
in net sales for firm i between year t - 1 and year t, and εit is the regression residuals which represent 
our proxy for abnormal cash flow from operations. PRODit is firm i’s production costs in year t, which 
equals the sum of the costs of goods sold plus changes in inventory, and εit is the regression residuals 
that represent our proxy for abnormal production costs. DISXPit is the discretionary expenses including 
selling, general and administrative expenses, R&D, and advertising for firm i in year t, and εit is the 
regression residuals representing our proxy for abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
 
Moreover, to capture the overall effects of real earnings management through these three 
activities in a comprehensive measure, and consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012), 
Kang and Kim (2012), Goh et al. (2013), Ge and Kim (2014), Kuo et al. (2014), Achleitner et al. (2014), 
Doukakis (2014), Zhu at al. (2015) and Al-Shattarat et al. (2018), the study also constructs an overall 
proxy by combining the aforementioned individual proxies to capture the total effects of real earnings 
management. The abnormal operational cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied 
by −1. Accordingly, high values for the proxies for abnormal cash flow (ABCFO) and abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABDISXP) indicate greater degrees of real activities management. The 
aggregate real management proxy is expressed as: 
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REM_ALL = -Abnormal cash flow from operations + Abnormal production costs -Abnormal 
discretionary expenses (4) 
Further, we divide this aggregate measure into two sub-aggregate measures; REM1 and REM2. 
REM1 equal to the additive inverse of abnormal cash flow from operations and the abnormal production 
costs. REM2 equals the sum of the additive inverse of abnormal cash flow from operations and the 
additive inverse of abnormal discretionary expenses. The larger value of REM_ALL, REM1, and REM2 
suggests greater use of real earnings management to manage the reported earnings. 
3.2.2 Model Specification 
Following the previous literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; 
Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018), the current study focuses on firms that meet either zero 
earnings or the previous year’s earnings because such firms are expected to have strong incentives to 
meet earnings targets by manipulating real activities. Therefore, this study will first examine the 
managerial tendency to meet zero earnings and the previous year’s earnings. Then it will investigate the 
impact of meeting these targets on the Jordanian firms’ future operating performance. Accordingly, the 
current study adopts the following model:  
REMit = α0+ β1 SUSPECTit+ β2 FSIZEit + β3 MKTBit + β4 ROAit + β5-8 YEARDUMit + εit 
(5) 
Where REM is either the aggregate measure (REM_ALL) or the two sub-aggregate measures 
(REM1 and REM2), SUSPECT as is an indicator variable that indicates the presence of just meeting 
earnings targets, it is set equal to one if (a) net income divided by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, or 
(b) the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is between 0 and 0.01, zero 
otherwise (Gunny, 2010; Francis et al., 2016). Based on the first hypothesis, the coefficient of the 
variable SUSPECT is expected to be positive and significant. The present study also controls several 
economic factors that may affect managers’ tendency to meet earnings benchmarks through real 
earnings manipulation, including growth opportunities (MKTBK) and leverage (LEV). According to 
Roychowdhury (2006), suspect firm-years with more growth opportunities and high levels of 
outstanding debt are more likely to have more real earnings manipulations. Further, to control for 
systematic variations in earnings management with firm size and operating performance, the current 
study includes firm size (SIZE) and return on assets (ROA). Roychowdhury (2006) runs 15 separate 
annual cross-sectional regressions and reports the means of the coefficients across industry years. 
However, an arithmetic mean of coefficients will not consider the fact that the number of observations 
varies across different years. Thus, in line with Zang (2012), one regression is run with a year indicator 
incorporated to account for any variation related to year effects in order to avoid such a problem. It is 
worth noting here that since the dependent variables are expressed as deviations from industry year 
means, all the aforementioned control variables are also measured in the same way (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018).   
13 
 
Secondly, in order to investigate the impact of REM on Jordanian firms’ future performance 
and to disentangle the two conflicting effects of real earnings management (value-destroying and 
signalling or (real benefits)) for the sample firms, this study follows prior studies (e.g. Gunny, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018) and adopts the following regression model: 
CFOt+1 = α0+ β1 REM_ DUMit + β2 REM_ DUMit* SUSPECTit + β3 SUSPECTit + β4 ROAit + 
β5 STKRETit + β6 FSIZEit + β7 MKTBit + β8 ZSCOREit+ β9-13 INDDUMit + β14-17YEARDUMit + εit (6) 
Where CFOt+1 is the industry-adjusted future cash flow from operations equals the difference 
between firm-specific CFO and the median CFO for the same year and industry (one-digit SIC), REM 
is either the aggregate measure (REM_ALL) or the two sub-aggregate measures (REM1 and REM2). 
Consistent with Gunny (2010) and Zhao et al. (2012), these proxies for abnormal real activities are 
converted into dummies (i.e., REM_ALL_D, REM1_D, and REM2_D) with a value of 1 if they are 
above the corresponding medians and 0 otherwise. For convenience, the current study uses REM_DUM 
to refer to these dummies. Further, the study uses SUSPECT as is an indicator variable that indicates 
the presence of just meeting earnings targets; it is set equal to one if (a) net income divided by total 
assets is between 0 and 0.01, or (b) the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t 
is between 0 and 0.01, zero otherwise. The coefficient of the standalone term REM_DUM, β1, captures 
the main effect of abnormal real activities on future performance. The coefficient of the interaction term 
REM_ DUM* SUSPECT, β2, captures the incremental effect of real earnings management (i.e., 
abnormal real activities in the presence of just meeting earnings targets) relative to abnormal real 
activities in the absence of just meeting earnings targets. 
According to Gunny (2010), a negative association between just meeting earnings benchmarks 
by using REM and subsequent performance suggests that opportunistic managers use operational or 
accounting discretion to harm the shareholders. For instance, managers might engage in REM to just 
meet an earnings target to increase stock prices, job security, or bonuses (Matsunaga and Park, 2001). 
At the same time, a positive association is consistent with managers using operational discretion to just 
meet benchmarks in order to: (i) signal future firm value or (ii) achieve benefits that allow the firm to 
work better in the future. According to Gunny and Zhang (2014), the signalling explanation emphasises 
that firms manage earnings to signal superior future performance; meeting the forecast (through 
earnings management) is a credible signal about a firm’s favourable position. Thus, subsequent 
operating performance is expected to be better than those who miss the target. In the Jordanian setting, 
the explanation of the real benefits proposes that the act of meeting an earnings target may provide 
benefits, such as improving the firm’s credibility and reputation with stakeholders (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). Such benefits could strengthen the relationships with such stakeholders as suppliers, 
customers, and creditors, which could boost future performance (Gunny and Zhang, 2014). 
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In order to control for the association between stock performance and future earnings, the stock 
return is included in the model. STKRET equal to the difference between firm-specific annual stock 
return and the median annual stock return for the same year and industry (one-digit SIC). FSIZE is the 
difference between the firm-specific natural logarithm of total assets and the median natural logarithm 
of total assets for the same year and industry (one-digit SIC). MKTB is the difference between the firm-
specific market value of equity divided by the book value of equity and the median market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity for the same year and industry (one-digit SIC). To control 
for the financial health of the firm, the Z-score for emerging markets developed by Altman (2005) is 
used in this model, which is:  EM Z-score = 3.25 + 6.56 (working capital / total assets) + 3.26 (retained 
earnings / total assets) + 6.72 (operating income / total assets) + 1.05 (book value of equity / total 
liabilities).  The current study industry-adjusted all the continuous control variables before running the 
regressions consistent with the dependent variable. 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control 
variables used to test our hypotheses. Table 2 is divided into two panels: Panel A illustrates the mean, 
median, standard deviation, 25% and 75% quantile values, Skewness and Kurtosis for the full sample 
variables across the five-year sample period. At the same time, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics 
for these variables after splitting the full sample into two sub-samples: suspect and non-suspect sample 
firms.   
                                       ---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
As can be seen from Panel A in Table 2, and similar to previous studies (e.g. Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012; Kang and Kim, 2012; Goh et al.,2013; Kuo et al.,2014 and Jiang et al., 2018), the means 
of earnings management proxies in this study are almost zero, implying that the models fit the data 
fairly well. The median for the comprehensive REM measure equals 1.5%, which is slightly higher than 
the 1.3% reported in China (Kuo et al., 2014). Further, the medians for the two sub-aggregate real 
proxies (REM1 and REM2) equal 6% and 7%, respectively. While REM1 ranges from -0.070 to 0.078, 
REM2 ranges from -0.051 to 0.062. SUSPECT has a mean (median) of 10.9% (0) of the total sample. 
This is similar to the mean (median) for suspect firms reported by Zhao et al. (2012). With regard to the 
future cash flow from operations for the subsequent year (CFOt+1), it shows a mean (median) of 5.4% 
(4.6%) respectively; ranging from -0.18% to 10.08%. Stock returns (STKRET) shows a mean of -5.6%, 
ranging from -24% to 8.1%. Finally, the financial health for Jordanian firms proxied by Altman’s 
ZSCORE (2005) for emerging markets (ZSCORE) shows a mean of 9.9, ranging between 4.6 and 10.5.  
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Panel B of Table 2 shows that 189 firm-year observations fall within the suspect category, and 
693 firm-year observations fall within the non-suspect category. The descriptive analysis for these two 
sub-samples provides initial evidence in support of our research hypotheses. Consistent with previous 
literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012), the means of the aggregate 
measures of real earnings management (REM_All, REM1, and REM2), for suspect firms-years sample, 
are significantly higher than that of the non-suspect firms-years sample. This provides initial evidence 
that suspect firms are more likely to manipulate their real activities in order to achieve certain 
benchmarks, which, in turn, corroborates the validity of focusing on such suspect firm years in this 
study.  Furthermore, Panel B shows that the subsequent cash flow from operations (CFOt+1) for suspect 
firms is higher than that of non-suspect firms. In particular, suspect firms have a mean of 5.2% 
compared with 4.6% for non-suspect firms, providing initial evidence and support for the notion that 
suspect firms, which engage in more REM, experience higher subsequent operating cash flows. As for 
control variables, suspect firms show a higher return on assets (ROA) than the rest of the sample. In 
particular, the mean ROA for suspect firms is equal to 0.46%, compared to 0.45% for the rest of the 
sample.  In addition, non-suspect firms have a greater average market to book value (mean MKTB= 
1.36) compared to suspect firms’ sample (mean MKTB = 0.972).  However, the stock returns for suspect 
firms are higher than that of non-suspect firms as suspect firms show a mean of -3.8% compared to -
5.8% for non-suspect firms. In addition, non-suspect firms appear to be in a healthier financial condition 
than suspect firms. Additionally, based on conducting a two-tailed t-test (mean comparison T-Test), 
Panel B of Table 2 mostly shows significant differences between the means of the research variables 
for the Suspect firms and the means of variables for non-suspect firms. Overall, and consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018), suspect and 
non-suspect firm-years are found to be different in terms of their financial aspects in the Jordanian 
context.  
 4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
4.2.1 Real Earnings management to Achieve Zero Earnings or Previous Year’s Earnings 
in Jordanian Listed Firms 
 
Table 3 presents the results of multivariate pooled regression analysis for the first model used 
in this study. Following Roychowdhury (2006), all reported p values are based on the Newey and West 
procedure. 
                                     ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
As can be seen from the above Table and consistent with our prediction in the first hypothesis, 
there is a significant positive relationship between SUSPECT and the aggregate measure of REM 
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(coefficient = 0.03, and p<0.05), indicating that Jordanian firms that meet zero earnings or previous 
year’s earnings are engaged in real activities manipulation. More specifically, Jordanian firms have 
unusually low abnormal CFO, low abnormal discretionary expenses, and high abnormal production 
costs. This finding is consistent with previous literature reviews, such as Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Gunny (2010). Also, it is consistent with Zang (2012), where the suspects are firm-years just 
beating/meeting zero benchmarks.   
With respect to control variables, the results show that the size of the firm (FSIZE) is 
statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the results reported by Roychowdhury (2006). 
However, the coefficient on the market to book ratio (MKTB), as shown in Table 3, is negative (-0.038) 
and is significant at 1% (t.statistic =-3.43), suggesting that firms with high growth opportunities are less 
likely to manage real activities to meet certain earnings benchmarks. This is consistent with the findings 
of Roychowdhury (2006), Zang (2012), Ge and Kim (2014) and Al-Shattarat et al. (2018). With regard 
to the return on assets, the result shows that the coefficient of the (ROA) is negative and significant 
(coefficient = -0.62, and p<0.01), indicating that better-performing firms are less likely to manage real 
activities to achieve zero earnings or previous year’s earnings. This is consistent with the results 
reported by Kang and Kim (2012) and Talbi et al. (2015). 
Table 4 exhibits the previous multivariate pooled regression results using the two sub-aggregate 
REM measures as dependent variables. In particular, the study uses the REM1, which refers to the sum 
of abnormal production costs, and the additive inverse of abnormal cash flows from operations, and 
REM2, which refers to the sum of the additive inverse of abnormal cash flows from operations and the 
additive inverse of abnormal discretionary expenses, as dependent variables. The Table provides 
inferences similar to those of the previous analysis with only two exceptions. Firstly, when using the 
REM1 as a dependent variable, the SUSPECT appears to be positively but insignificantly related to 
REM1, indicating that Jordanian firms do not commonly use either sales manipulations or 
overproduction to meet certain earnings benchmark. Therefore, in the following subsection, the study 
will split up this measure (REM1) into its main individual components, namely; abnormal production 
costs and the abnormal cash flow from operations, to find out which suspect firms use particular real 
activity in order to achieve zero earnings or last year earnings targets. Secondly, evidence of a positive 
relationship appeared between the firm size and the two sub-aggregate REM measures, indicating that 
larger firms are more likely to manipulate real activities to meet the desired earnings targets.  
                                      ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 




Table 5 presents the results of multivariate pooled regression analysis for each individual 
component of REM1, namely the abnormal production costs (ABPROD) and the abnormal cash flow 
from operations (ABCFO). Following Roychowdhury (2006), all reported p values are based on the 
Newey and West procedure. 
                                       ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
As can be seen from the above table, when using the ABPROD to proxy for real earnings 
manipulations through overproduction, the coefficient of SUSPECT is significant and positive 
(coefficient = 0.038, and p<0.10), indicating that Jordanian firms that meet zero earnings or previous 
year’s earnings have unusually high production costs. This result is consistent with Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Gunny (2010), who found that suspect firms experience unusually high production costs. 
Also, it is consistent with Zang (2012), where the suspects are firm-years just beating/meeting zero 
benchmarks. As for sales manipulations, Table 5 shows that the coefficient of the (ABCFO) is positive. 
However, it is insignificant, suggesting that Jordanian firms are less likely to use sales manipulations 
to meet earnings benchmarks. Instead, they rely more on overproduction. This outcome is not in line 
with those of prior studies in the US such as Gunny (2010) and Leggett et al. (2016) and in the UK such 
as Shattarat et al. (2018) that provided evidence suggests that companies that manipulate their sales in 
the incidence of meeting earnings benchmarks are significantly associated with subsequent operating 
performance. In the unique setting of Jordan, we argue that REM activities through sales-based 
manipulations impair credit rating and are linked with higher bond yield spreads (Ge and Kim, 2014). 
Thus, the positive coefficient for REM1, which was reported in Table 4, is mainly attributed to 
overproduction practices, not to sales manipulations. 
 The inferences on the control variables in the model remain unchanged and consistent with 
those reported in the previous analysis. 
4.2.2 The Impact of Real Earnings Management, Intended to Achieve Certain 
Benchmarks on Jordanian Firms’ Future Operating Performance 
 
Given the existence of REM to meet zero earnings or previous year’s earnings, this study 
examines the association between Jordanian firms' future operating performance, measured by the 
difference between firm-specific CFO and the median CFO for the same year and industry (one-digit 
SIC), and REM intended to achieve zero earnings or previous year's earnings. To proxy for the overall 
impact of REM on future performance, the aggregate real earnings measure is used in this study, along 
with the two sub-aggregate measures (REM1 and REM2). As previously discussed, these proxies are 
converted into dummies with a value of 1 if they are above the corresponding medians and 0 otherwise. 
The current study industry-adjusted all the continuous control variables before running the regressions 
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consistent with the dependent variable. Table 6 presents the results of multivariate pooled regression 
analysis for this model. Following Hussainey and Walker (2009), Gunny (2010), Zhao et al. (2012) and 
Al-Shattarat et al. (2018), the t-tests in these models are computed using robust standard errors 
correcting for firm clusters.  
                                        ---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
                                        ---------------------------------------------- 
 
As can be seen from Table 6 and consistent with Gunny (2010), Zhao et al. (2012), and Al-
Shattarat et al. (2018), the main effect of REM is negative and significant (t-statistic =-1.83, p<0.10), 
suggesting a general value-destroying effect of abnormal real activities in the absence of just meeting 
earnings benchmarks. However, as expected in the first hypothesis, the table shows that the interaction 
term (i.e., REM_ DUM* SUSPECT) is significantly and positively associated with future operating 
performance (t-statistic =2.99, p< 0.01), which suggests that suspect firms using real earnings 
management activities to meet zero or last year earnings have better subsequent operating performance. 
This implies that the benefits of achieving the aforementioned benchmarks can offset the negative 
impact of real earnings manipulations on future performance. This evidence is consistent with signalling 
(or real benefits) rather than opportunism, suggesting that abnormal real activities intended just to meet 
zero earnings or previous year’s earnings can improve the firm's credibility and reputation with 
stakeholders, strengthening, therefore, the relationships with these stakeholders and allowing for better 
future performance (Gunny and Zhang, 2014). This is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
such as Gunny (2010), Zhao et al. (2012), Al-Shattarat et al. (2018) and Jiang et al. (2018), which also 
document a significant positive relationship between REM intended to meet earnings benchmarks and 
firm future operating performance.   
Table 6 also reports the bootstrapped2 standards errors. The results of the bootstrapping process 
give credibility to the main findings. Turnings to control variables, the coefficient estimate on the 
industry-adjusted ROA is significant and positive, indicating that current-period return on assets is 
positively associated with future industry-adjusted CFO. Moreover, in line with Kothari and Sloan 
(1992), Gunny (2010) and Zhao et al. (2012), the industry-adjusted stock return is positive and 
significant (coefficient = 0.38, and p<0.10), suggesting that firms with greater returns have better future 
operating performance. However, similar to Zhao et al. (2012), firm size, growth opportunities and 
financial health are not statistically significant. Further, qualitatively similar results appeared when 
 
2 The bootstrap is a computational resampling technique for finding standard errors (and in fact other things such as confidence intervals), 
with the only input being the procedure for calculating the estimate (or estimator) of interest on a sample of data (Dopazo, 1994). The idea of 
the bootstrap is to mimic the process of randomly sampling from an assumed infinite population. Ordinarily, we take a sample from a 
population, and the standard error reflects the variability between the estimates we would obtain if we repeatedly took samples from the 
population (Efron, 1988). The bootstrap mimics this process by treating our observed sample as if it were the population. It then repeatedly 
takes (say B) samples (of the same size as the original sample), with replacement, from our original sample (note there are other types of 
bootstrap sampling. This is so called non-parametric bootstrap sampling) (Bisani & Ney, 2004). For each of these B samples, we then calculate 




using the two sub-aggregate measures (REM1 and REM2) to test for the impact of REM on firms’ 
future performance. In particular, as Table 7 shows, the interaction term (i.e., REM_ DUM* SUSPECT) 
for REM1 and REM2 is positive and significant (t-statistic =2.73, and 2.71, respectively), supporting 
the previous result and ensuring that Jordanian firms with abnormal real activities used just to meet 
earnings targets have better subsequent operating performance than other firms.  
                                                    ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
                                        ---------------------------------------------- 
 
To sum up, as previous literature such as Gunny (2010), Zhao et al. (2012), Al-Shattarat et al. 
(2018) and  Jiang et al. (2018) found, the current study also provides evidence on the positive impact 
of real activities-based manipulations on future operating performance, indicating that Jordanian firms 
that just meet earnings targets by engaging in REM have significantly better subsequent industry-
adjusted cash flow from operations. This implies that earnings management through real activities is 
not totally opportunistic in Jordan, but it could be used for attaining benefits that lead to better future 
performance (Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018). This evidence 
is consistent with the signalling earnings management argument, which suggests that abnormal real 
activities intended just to meet zero earnings or previous year’s earnings can improve the firm's 
credibility and reputation, strengthening, therefore, the relationship with stakeholders and allowing for 
better future performance (Gunny and Zhang, 2014). This study is the first in Jordan and the MEAN 
region overall to provide this evidence to the researchers' best knowledge.   
5. Robustness Check 
5.1 Alternative Measure for Firms’ Future Operating Performance 
 
In this study's primary analysis, the firm's future performance was measured using the adjusted 
cash flow from operations. However, in this section, the primary analysis is re-estimated using an 
alternative definition of future performance. Particularly, following Gunny (2010), Al-Shattarat et al. 
(2018) and Jiang et al. (2018), the adjusted return on assets is used to proxy for the subsequent operating 
performance. That is, ADJ_ROAt+1 is the difference between firm-specific ROA and the median ROA 
for the same year and industry (one-digit SIC). Further, the model controls for the industry-adjusted 
return on equity instead of the return on assets. Similar to the primary analysis, the t-tests in this analysis 
are computed using robust standard errors correcting for firm clusters. The results of this analysis are 
reported in the following Table.  
                                        ----------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 




As the above table shows, the results of this analysis are qualitatively similar to those reported 
previously in the main analysis. However, these regressions provide better results in terms of an adjusted 
R-squared of 32.09%, 32.21%, and 31.66% for REM_ALL, REM1 and REM2, respectively. The results 
demonstrate that the interaction term (i.e., REM_ DUM* SUSPECT) is significantly and positively 
associated with future operating performance in all models. This supports our main results and suggests 
that abnormal real activities intended just to meet earnings benchmarks can strengthen relationships 
with stakeholders such as suppliers, customers and creditors, in turn, allowing for better future 
performance (Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Gunny and Zhang, 2014; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang 
et al., 2018). The inferences on the other variables in the model remain unchanged and comparable to 
those reported in the main analysis. However, while the firm size and financial health were insignificant 
in the main analysis, they become statistically significant under this analysis, indicating that larger firms 
with better financial health have better future operating performance. 
5.2 Splitting up the Second REM Aggregate Measure (REM2) 
Under the main analysis, the present study used the aggregate measures of REM to proxy for 
the overall real earnings manipulations. However, splitting up the aggregate measures into their main 
components can provide more insights into the extent to which each individual real activity is associated 
with firms just meeting earnings benchmarks. Consequently, this subsection splits up the main 
components of REM2, which is composed of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenditures3. Table 9 reports the results of this analysis and shows that the coefficient of 
the SUSPECT is significant and positive (coefficient = 0.013, and p<0.01), suggesting that Jordanian 
firms that meet zero or last year earnings are more likely to manipulate earnings by cutting down 
discretionary expenditures. Thus, manipulation of discretionary expenses is perhaps the most 
convenient way to manage earnings. This fact is well reflected in the positive sign and significance 
(t.statistic = 2.88***) of the coefficient on SUSPECT in the abnormal discretionary expenses model. 
This type of manipulation (ABDISXP) provides a great deal of flexibility in the timing and amount of 
spending. Therefore, managers may find this manipulation method less costly and easy compared to 
other manipulations methods. This supports confirms the robustness of the main regression results. This 
result is consistent with Roychowdhury (2006) findings and Zang (2012), where the suspects are firm-
years just beating/meeting zero benchmark or last year earnings. The regression results for other 
variables reveal similar inferences to those obtained by the primary regression models.  
                                      ----------------------------------------------- 




3 The first aggregate measure (REM1) has been already broken into its main components in Section 4.2.1.1.  
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5.3. Additional Control Variables: Sector Type and Foreign Ownership 
Also, in an effort to check the sensitivity of our findings to different levels of foreign ownership 
and various industrial activities, we rerun the OLS regression models for the two main proxies of the 
future operating performance (i.e., CFO t+1 and ROA t +1) using additional control variables, which are 
foreign ownership and industry type. The findings suggest that industry type and foreign ownership are 
positively and significantly associated with both subsequent operating performance proxy. This means 
that firms characterized by higher foreign ownership are likely to achieve better subsequent operating 
performance.  
Likewise, firms operating in mining, construction and manufacturing industries are associated 
with better future performance than those working in services, retail trade, and wholesale sectors. These 
additional test results give more credibility to our main findings (See Models 1 and 2 of Table 10). For 
example, the results demonstrate that the interaction term (i.e., REM_ DUM* SUSPECT) is 
significantly and positively associated with future operating performance proxies, i.e., CFO t+1 and ROA 
t +1. This also implies that abnormal real activities intended to meet earnings benchmarks to satisfy the 
needs of powerful stakeholders. This allows for better future operating performance (Gunny, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2012; Gunny and Zhang, 2014; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018). 
                                      ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
5.4. Endogeneity Check: Two-Step System GMM Model  
Following prior work (e.g., Gerged, 2020; Gerged et al., 2020; Ullah et al., 2018; Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2016), we estimate a two-step GMM model as a robustness analysis to overcome the 
potential incidence of endogeneity concerns arising from the reversal causality relations between 
abnormal real activities and future operating performance proxies. Specifically, we incorporate the lags 
of last year/two-year operating performance to distinguish between static and dynamic panel data 
estimators. Statistically speaking, by including lagged versions of the proxies of operating performance, 
the GMM estimation controls for the endogeneity concerns by internally transforming the data as the 
previous values of future operating performance proxies are subtracted from its present ones. The 
process of internal transformation appeared to reduce the number of total observations, thus enhancing 
the 2-step dynamic GMM estimators (Wooldridge, 2016).  
Models 3 and 4 of Table 10 show the findings of estimating the 2-step GMM models. Those 
findings are largely comparable to those presented in Tables 6 and 8. To the extent that the results are 






The present paper examines the consequences of REM on Jordanian firms subsequent operating 
performance. We contribute to earnings management literature by undertaking a comprehensive 
examination of three types of REM, namely, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production 
costs, and abnormal discretionary expenditures in the Jordanian context.  While there has been limited 
inconclusive research examining the consequences of REM, our study is the first in Jordan and the 
Middle East region overall to provide empirical evidence on the use of real earnings manipulations to 
meet zero or previous year earnings. Also, it is the first to document a positive relationship between 
REM and Jordanian firms’ future operating performance. Drawing upon panel data of 882 non-financial 
listed Jordanian firm-year observations over the period 2010–2018, we find that Jordanian firms that 
just meet zero or last year’s earnings exhibit evidence of real activities manipulations. More specifically, 
suspect firms show unusually low abnormal discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal 
production costs. Furthermore, supporting the signalling earnings management argument, our results 
show that abnormal real-based activities intended just to meet zero earnings or previous year’s earnings 
improve Jordanian firm’s subsequent operating performance. This implies that REM is not totally 
opportunistic, but it could be used for attaining benefits and lead to better subsequent operating 
performance (Gunny, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Al-Shattarat et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 
2018).  
Our evidence implies that managers appeared to resort to REM through discretionary expenses 
reductions. This type of manipulation is deemed one of the most convenient ways to manipulate 
earnings as it provides more flexibility in terms of time and spending.  Therefore, we recommend that 
internal auditors in the Jordanian listed companies concentrate their efforts on limiting the discretionary 
expenses-based manipulations to reduce real earnings management. Our findings also have important 
implications for policymakers, regulators and investors in their attempts to constrain earnings 
management practices and to enhance the financial reporting quality in Jordan.  
Our study represents an important extension to the current literature on real earnings 
management practices in fast-growing emerging markets like Jordan. However, this study is subject to 
some caveats. First, as raised by Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), companies that just meet 
earnings benchmarks might not be the only firms to manage earnings. Other companies might 
manipulate reported earnings and still miss these benchmarks or manipulate their earnings for 
unobservable and internal objectives. Second, there is also a possibility that some suspect firms might 
manage their earnings downward to just above the targets. Future research should take into account 
these issues and examine other benchmarks. Third, our evidence was limited to examining the impact 
of abnormal real earnings management activities on two future operating performance proxies (i.e., 
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CFO and ROA). Further studies are recommended to include more proxies for operating performance, 
such as two-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets and One-year-ahead industry-adjusted 
financial performance return on equity. Finally, future studies are recommended to examine corporate 
governance factors, such as the board of directors, sub-board committees, internal audit, external audit 
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Variables  Definition 
ABCFO Abnormal cash flows from operations, measured as deviations from the 
predicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
ABPROD Abnormal production costs, measured as deviations from the predicted values 
from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
ABDISXP Abnormal discretionary expenses, measured as deviations from the predicted 
values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
REM_ALL Aggregate real earnings management proxy, the sum of the additive inverse 
of abnormal cash flows from operations, the additive inverse of abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs. 
REM1 Aggregate real earnings management proxy 1, the sum of abnormal 
production costs and the additive inverse of abnormal cash flows from 
operations. 
REM2 Aggregate real earnings management proxy 2, the sum of the additive inverse 
of abnormal cash flows from operations and the additive inverse of abnormal 
discretionary expenses. 
SUSPECT Dummy variable that indicates the presence of just meeting earnings targets, 
it is set equal to one if (a) net income divided by total assets is between 0 and 
0.01, or (b) the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and 
t is between 0 and 0.01, zero otherwise. 
FSIZE  Firm size measured by the natural log of total assets. 
ROA Return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets. 
MKTB Market to book ratio. 
CFOt+1 Cash flows from operating activities, scaled by lagged total assets. 
STKRET Stock return for 12- months. 
ZSCORE Altman’s (2005) Z score for emerging markets in year t, where Altman’s Z 
score= 3.25 + 6.56 (working capital / total assets) + 3.26 (retained earnings / 
total assets) + 6.72 (operating income / total assets) + 1.05 (book value of 
equity / total liabilities). 
  
INDUS Industry type variable, which is measured by a categorical variable based on 
the one-digit SIC Code classification for six different industries. Consistent 
with Al-Shattarat et al. (2018), a company is given 1 if it relates to services, 
2 for Retail trade, 3 for Wholesale trade, 4 for Manufacturing, 5 for 
Construction, and 6 for Mining.  
FOW Foreign ownership is a dummy variable scores 1 if the foreign ownership is 
more than 50% and o otherwise. This categorisation of FOW is consistent 
with the ASE Annual report of 2019, indicating that the total foreign 
investments in ASE represent roughly 50% of the total market capitalisation 





























Table 1:  
Sample Selection Procedure 
Description 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Pooled 
Initial sample 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 1255 
Excluded:      
Financial sector 
companies 
(108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) 
Missing annual reports  (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (45) 
























 Descriptive Statistics – Panel A: The Full Sample 
Variables  Mean Median STDV 25% 75% 
REM_ALL 0.0000 0.0151 0.1696 -0.0812 0.1044 
REM1 0.0000 0.0066 0.1362 -0.0701 0.0782 
REM2 -0.0000 0.0071 0.1004 -0.0512 0.0627 
SUSPECT 0.10911 0.0000 0.3121 0.0000 0.0000 
FSIZE 16.8983 16.9263  1.3363 15.9912 17.7068 
ROA 0.0045 0.0140 0.0852 -0.0299 0.0510 
MKTB 1.3172 0.9900 0.9140 0 .6900    1.6900 
CFOt+1 0.0504 0.0468 0.0961 -0.0018 0.1008 
STKRET -0.0560 -0.0257 0.3239 -0.2439 0.0817 
ZSCORE 9.9628 7.1241 11.0347 4.6016 10.5397 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. This table presents the descriptive statistics 
of the variables in the regression models used to test the ninth and tenth hypotheses. High values for 
the proxies of REM indicate greater degrees of real activities management. The sample consists of 882 







Descriptive Statistics – Panel B: Suspect and Non-suspect Sample Firms 
 Suspect (n=189) Non-suspect (n=693)  
Variables  Mean Median STDV 25% 75% Mean Median STDV 25% 75% Mean Comparison T-Test 
REM_ALL 0.0373 0.0420 0.1303 -0.0335 0.1177 -0.0056 0.0146 0.1728 -0.0874 0.1035 15.921(0.000)*** 
REM1 0.0233 0.0143 0.1102 -0.0353 0.0778 -0.0034 0.0057 0.1378 -0.0817 0.0773 6.179(0.000)*** 
REM2 0.0211 0.0200 0.0810 -0.0333 0.0622 -0.0037 0.0057 0.1015 -0.0585 0.0606 4.946(0.000)*** 
FSIZE 17.0454 16.7753 1.3527 16.0169 17.8027 16.8791 16.9471 1.3339 15.9694 17.6171 3.145(0.002)** 
ROA 0.0046 0.0044 0.0026 0.0028 0.0070 0.0045 0.0230 0.0906 -0.0378 0.0599 -0.594(0.552) 
MKTB 0.9729   0.8900 0.5998 0.6100 1.0700 1.3622 1.04 0.9385 0.69 1.79 -4.764(0.000)*** 
CFOt+1 0.0520 0.0528 0.0647 0.0154 0.0841 0.0502 0.0464 0.0995 -0.0043 0.1032 -0.004(0.997) 
STKRET -0.0381 -0.04388 0.3208 -0.2876 0.1445 -0.0584 -0.0242 0.32447 -0.2295 0.0808 2.334( 0.012)** 
ZSCORE 7.7529 5.9132 9.3975 4.0338 7.807 10.2522 7.4382 11.2045 4.6834 11.0927 -3.222( 0.001)*** 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. Suspect firm-years are firm-years that have (a) net income divided by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, or (b) 
the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is between 0 and 0.01, zero otherwise. There are 189 suspect firm-years and 693 non-suspect firm years.  





Real Earnings management to Achieve Zero or Previous Year’s Earnings, Aggregate REM Measure 
 REM_ALL 
Variables Coefficients t. Statistic p-value 
SUSPECT 0.033   2.02** 0.046   
FSIZE 0.007 1.56 0.117 
MKTB -0.038 -3.43*** 0.000 
ROA -0.628 -5.77*** 0.000 
YEARDUM Inc. Inc. Inc. 
_Cons -0.000 -0.02 0.967 
Adj R-squared 11.6% 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using the Newey–West procedure. The parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 



























Real Earnings Management to Achieve Zero or Previous year’s Earnings, Sub-aggregate REM Measures 
 REM1 REM2 
Variables Coefficients t. Statistic Coefficients t. Statistic 
SUSPECT 0.042 1.39   0.021 1.72* 
FSIZE 0.007 1.70*   0.001   1.87* 
MKTB -0.011   -2.99 ***  0.003 -3.55*** 
ROA -0.813 -7.21*** 0.056 -3.89*** 
YEARDUM Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
_Cons 0.000   0.03 0.007 0.00 
Adj R-squared  13.91% 10.85% 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using the Newey–West procedure. The parameter estimates are based 
on the following model: 























 Real Earnings Management to Achieve Zero or Previous year’s Earnings, Split REM1 
 ABPROD ABCFO 
Variables Coefficients t. Statistic Coefficients t. Statistic 
SUSPECT 0.038 1.92* 0.003 0.88 
FSIZE 0.003 0.67 0.009 2.36** 
MKTB -0.050 -2.22** -0.015 -3.28*** 
ROA -0.312 -3.92*** -0.213 -7.72*** 
YEARDUM Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
_Cons 0.000 -0.05 0.007 0.18 
Adj R-squared 8.66% 12.96% 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using the Newey–West procedure. The parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 
ABPRODit or ABCFOit = α0+ β1 SUSPECTit+ β2 FSIZEit + β3 MKTBit+ β4 ROAit +β5-13 YEARDUM + ε it (5)





























Coefficients t. Statistic 
REM_ DUM - -0.010** -0.270 -1.83* 
REM_ DUM* SUSPECT + 0.0120*** 0.221 2.99*** 
SUSPECT - -0.022*** -0.183 -2.25** 
ROA + 0.012*** 3.772 4.42*** 
STKRET + 0.001*** 0.385 1.88* 
FSIZE + 0.014 0.036 0.77 
MKTB + 0.076 0.053 0.74 
ZSCORE + -0.051 -0.003 -1.33 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 







Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using robust standard errors correcting for firm clusters. The 
parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
CFOt+1 = α0+ β1 REM_ DUMit + β2 REM_ DUMit* SUSPECTit + β3 SUSPECTit + β4 ROAit + β5 STKRETit + β6 




















Impact of REM on Future Performance as proxied by  CFO t+1 – Sub-aggregate Measures 
  REM1_DUM REM2_DUM 
Variables Exp. 
sign 
Coefficients t. Statistic Coefficients t. Statistic 
REM_ DUM - -0.131     -1.77* -0.289 -2.33** 
REM_DUM*SUSPECT + 0.521 2.73***   0.377 2.71** 
SUSPECT - -0.360 -2.33** -0.357 -1.43 
ROA + 3.448 4.49*** 3.302 5.18*** 
STKRET + 0.305 1.88* 0.307 1.91* 
FSIZE + 0.052 0.66 0.053 0.59 
MKTB + 0.032 0.83 0.033 0.85 
ZSCOREt + -0.006 -1.03 -0.004 -1.07 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 







Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using robust standard errors correcting for firm clusters. 
CFOt+1 = α0+ β1 REM_ DUMit + β2 REM_ DUMit* SUSPECTit + β3 SUSPECTit + β4 ROAit+ β5 STKRETit + β6 





















 Impact of REM on ROAt+1 measure of future performance 
  REM_ALL REM1 REM2 
Variables Exp. 
sign 
t. Statistic t. Statistic t. Statistic 
REM_ DUM - -1.77* -2.86** -2.13**   
REM_DUM* SUSPECT + 2.23** 2.52** 2.24** 
SUSPECT - -1.34 -1.88* -1.59 
STKRET + 1.69* 1.56 1.71* 
FSIZE + 2.99*** 3.22*** 3.12*** 
MKTB + 0.26 0.21 0.29 
ROE  + 6.66*** 6.70*** 6.37*** 
ZSCORE + 2.25** 2.23** 2.03** 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. 









Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using robust standard errors correcting for firm clusters. 
ROAt+1 = α0+ β1 REM_ DUMit + β2 REM_ DUMit* SUSPECTit + β3 SUSPECTit + β4 REMit + β5 STKRETit + β6 





















 Real Earnings Management to Achieve Zero or Previous year’s Earnings 
 ABDISXP 
Variables Coefficients t. Statistic p-value 
SUSPECT 0.013 2.88*** 0.003 
FSIZE 0.002   0.65 0.578 
MKTB -0.005 -2.07** 0.033   
ROA -0.003 -0.03   0.968 









Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The T-tests are computed using the Newey–West procedure. The parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: 





















Table 10:  
Additional sensitivity checks  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
MODELS    CFO t +1 
OLS 
   ROA t +1 
OLS 
   CFO t +1 
2-Step GMM 
   ROA t +1 
2-Step GMM 
REM_ DUM -.032*** -.036*** -.03*** -.005*** 
   (.011) (.006) (.002) (.001) 
REM_ DUM* SUSPECT .111*** .065*** -.014*** .011*** 
   (.034) (.018) (.005) (.002) 
 SUSPECT -.049*** -.035*** -.008** -.001* 
   (.016) (.009) (.003) (.000) 
 ZSCORE -.001* -.000* -.000* -.000*** 
   (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 FSIZE .038 .057** .025 .002*** 
   (.04) (.022) (.003) (.001) 
 STKRET .061*** .005* .017*** .000 
   (.01) (.006) (.001) (.000) 
 ROA .344*** - .261*** - 
   (.057)  (.031)  
ROE - .039*** - .05*** 
  (.011)  (.003) 
 MKTB .034 .003 .013 .001 
   (.007) (.004) (.001) (.000) 
 INDUS .063*** .010* .009*** .000 
   (.021) (.051) (.001) (.000) 
 FOW .098* .177*** .004*** .007*** 
   (.052) (.029) (.028) (.032) 
 L.CFO - - .927*** - 
     (.006)  
 L2.CFO - - .403*** - 
     (.002)  
 L.ROA - - - 1.148*** 
      (.007) 
 L2.ROA - - - .114*** 
      (.002) 
 _cons .195*** .038 - - 
   (.07) (.038)   
 Observations 882 882 686 686 
 Pseudo R2 13.9 23.8 - - 
AR(1) - - 0.0034 0.0011 
AR(2) - - 0.1233 0.2411 
Sargan test statistics - - 96.501 88.705 
Notes: Variables are operationally defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<.01, 
** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
